Cyberspace is a new global space that is yet not fully explored nor effectively regulated. The authors are not sketching a regulatory framework for cyberspace, but instead are inclined to glean valuable experience from the developments in the regulation of other global spaces, especially the sea. First, the peculiarities of cyberspace and cybercrime are briefly outlined. Then, the other global spaces are analysed drawing comparisons between exploration, appropriation and regulations of the sea and the air and cyberspace. The authors suggest that it is vital to learn lessons from the past in order to achieve an effective model of regulation of cyberspace. One of the main focus points of the paper is the position of a pirate and the ways of regulating piracy in different global spaces.
INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace is relatively new, and the challenges of its regulation and lawenforcement are still difficult to tackle. This new global space is still very much unexplored. Because of its unique global nature, the problems in cyberspace are spanning beyond the jurisdiction of a sovereign state.
Despite the abundance of strategies and proposals, very little has been achieved as to universal agreement on cyberspace regulation. At the same time, there is a pressing need to regulate the cyberspace effectively because of its strategic importance, among other things, for the communications, businesses, governmental and non-governmental institutions, and, increasingly, the military.
Thus, an effective regulatory framework is needed and for this end the specificities of cyberspace have to be understood and put in the wider context of different regulatory frameworks.
The authors argue that the nature and peculiarities of cyberspace and its possible regulation are best understood if compared to the other global spaces, especially with the sea. It is not the aim of this paper to sketch an alternative regulatory framework for cyberspace. However, it is submitted that by understanding the historical developments of the global spaces, the changes of their legal status and the philosophical as well as technological underpinnings of such changes, one would be able to learn from the past experience and potentially come up with more realistic and effective solutions for the regulation of cyberspace.
Although the idea of treating cyberspace similarly to other global spaces has been raised as early as 1998, 1 such suggestions were more concerned with attempts to define jurisdiction over the space and to develop an effective nationality principle.
More recent cyberspace regulation theories have discarded the quest for problematic territoriality principle in cyberspace favouring universal jurisdiction which often is inspired by the treatment of pirates in Maritime Law. 2 However, the attempts to place cyberspace in the family of the global spaces are rather occasional and tailored for specific purposes to discuss sporadic issues of cyberspace and/or cybercrime.
First part of the paper provides a brief overview of the nature of cyberspace, its uniqueness, cyber criminal activities and their problematic. In the second part a parallel between cyberspace and the sea is explored offering insights as to why while the customary law analogy fails to pinpoint who are the relevant actors whose custom is to be taken into account. Finally, one of the most grandiose propositions is the creation of a global cyber security system and an international cyber court. 13 While such solution would most probably solve the problem of jurisdiction, the willingness of states to commit to such an institution appears to be doubtful.
CYBERSPACE AND CYBERCRIME
One has to be aware of the unique nature of the cyberspace. Despite of the presence of what Yar calls the 'recognizable geography', i.e. the application of references to space and place, such as 'portals', 'sites', 'cafes', 'classrooms', etc., 14 cyberspace is fundamentally new. Perplexingly, there is no single all-encompassing definition of cyberspace. The Advocate General Cruz Villalon at the European Court of Justice has recently described cyberspace as one which has transformed the spatial and territorial conception of communications and thus has created an intangible or even ungraspable space which has no limits or frontiers enabling the transfer of information immediately with the potency of storing the information holocaust denial is a crime in France whereas in the USA it is not and, as it was in
Yahoo case, 27 the government might choose to prosecute an entity for providing access to the citizens to prohibited material. Cybercrimes can affect people around the globe, spread in the matter of minutes or hours, and it is hard to estimate the harm inflicted by such crimes. 28 Contrastingly, terrestrial crimes are confined to the locality and normally are restricted by state borders. Also, they are small-scale and tend to be personal. Thus, the apprehension of offenders is relatively easy compared with cybercriminals who act globally without any restrain of sovereign states' borders. Moreover, criminal activity in cyberspace has the potential to spread around the globe quicker than anything before. 29
SUPPLY OF CRIMINALS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO OFFEND
Piracy has always been an issue where effective control was lacking: in the high seas and in territories where local government is weak and unable to enforce order, a recent example being an upsurge in piracy off Somalia. 30 This is also true for cybercrime which flourishes not only due to the lack of control but also due to the unwillingness or inability of some states to tackle it within their own jurisdiction. 31 of criminal acts is much easier in cyberspace. There is no need to travel in order to carry out a criminal act, and at once many victims can be targeted easily and quickly. 37 Also, there are different tools that are on offer for sale to facilitate or even to carry out a criminal act online effortlessly and without any prior knowledge. 38 After all, cyberspace is perceived as enabling anonymity. 39 Moreover, statistics suggest that people turn to cybercrime for living, because it is relatively easy to commit a crime and cover up the traces and the apprehension is perceived as low risk. 40 There are numerous reasons why cyberspace offers more opportunities to offend than physical space. First of all, there are no frontiers in cyberspace, thus the barriers are lacking to stop one from offending. Artificial borders can be introduced by national or supranational regulations but they are rarely effective.
Easy access to a pool of potential victims is a tempting feature of cyberspace. 41 Closely related is the ability to affect multiple locations around the world (or the entire globe itself) from one particular location, however remote. 42 Or, conversely, it is not rare that an attack that at first appeared to have taken place from a distant 32 Peter Grabosky, "The Global Dimension of Cybercrime," Global Crime Cybercrime also enjoys an unprecedented scale as nowhere else there is such a high number of victims and lucrative targets which can be reached without physically travelling. 45 Moreover, identification of the offender is difficult because of the nature of commission of cybercrime: it is relatively easy to trace the origins of the crime but much more complicated to identify the offender himself. 46 It can be said that the internet has eliminated borders -and the applicability of national law with them -to an unprecedented extent. 47 Especially, with no effective global law governing cyberspace, and the difficulties associated with prosecuting criminals because of the jurisdictional limits, it is difficult to identify, catch, and put to trial the offenders who operate in cyberspace. 48 These jurisdictional limits order the absence of unified legal definitions of crimes (certain acts in cyberspace are not globally outlawed) and inherently the states are often unable to prosecute offenders that are beyond their reach. Moreover, usually it is impossible to clearly determine where a crime originated from because the crime scene is virtual. 49 What is more, even when regulation is available either on national or supranational level, the sheer pace of technological advancement and thus the development of new crimes becomes an issue as it threatens to outpace the attempts to define emerging crimes. 50 Finally, the property that is in cyberspace is intangible thus easily and conveniently transportable once accessed but nevertheless might be extremely valuable. 51 The opportunities to offend in cyberspace are vast as the cyberspace itself and, moreover, are being developed together with the new technologies.
LACK OF CAPABLE GUARDIANS
The interconnectedness of the terrestrial space and the cyberspace is problematic: while it is indeed true that actions in the latter have clear consequences in the former, 52 it is not necessarily true the other way round. offences it has to be relied on existing property laws and this poses problems when computer data is in question: traditional concept of property does not apply if, for example, the data was not modified but merely accessed. 62 Also, a question arises as to which units of cyberspace environment are to be regulated: cyberspace as a whole or just a definite list of elements that make up the 'greater picture' (for example, 'cookies', banners, applications, etc.). 63 The first perspective means significant risk of diminishing freedom online. The second, meanwhile, risks to be outpaced by rapid developments in cyberspace.
There are even more aspects that contribute to the lack of capable guardians in preventing criminal activity in cyberspace: first, the space is so vast that it is virtually impossible to police it all (combining crime prevention, interception of an ongoing criminal activity and investigation). 64 Secondly, social norms formed in cyberspace are important in shaping behaviour there. 65 As already mentioned, people often perceive the standards of behaviour to be lower in cyberspace, and thus it is impossible to enforce something that is thought to be morally right by the masses. Thirdly, although governments can pressure software development companies, internet service providers and other major actors that are within their jurisdiction to implement anti-cybercrime measures, such controls are not necessarily effective due to the global interconnectedness of cyberspace. 66 Also, the self-regulatory cyberspace governance poses problems not only because the 60 John Blau, "Battle Brewing over International Internet Regulation," IEEE Spectrum (December 2012) // http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/internet/battle-brewing-over-international-internet-regulation (accessed December 26, 2012 63 Bernhard Maier, supra note 20: 161. 64 Majid Yar, supra note 14: 423. 65 Ibid.: 423. 66 Jose MA. Emmanuel Caral, supra note 6: 3. 
THE THREE GLOBAL SPACES
Cyberspace is not entirely unique in its lack of borders and regulation: the sea and the air are the earlier (already appropriated) global spaces. 70 Therefore, a parallel between cyberspace and the sea can be illustrative. It is noteworthy that the advocates of freedom in cyberspace often ground their ideas on the Grotian doctrine of the freedom of the sea. Also, certain illegal activities in cyberspace are named as 'piracy'. 71 It is no coincidence that the current official definition of piracy includes illegal acts involving both ships and aircraft 72 -the vessels operating in the two global spaces.
THE APPROPRIATION OF THE SEA
An important insight into the nature of the sea and piracy is offered by a nothing regarding the sea was mentioned because the sea was perceived as beyond the relations between people and nations. Land and sea were simply incommensurable and the traditional notions of imperium and dominium that characterised pre-modern sovereignty simply did not apply. 78 The sea also was a source of fear and mystery -as a notable example, the Apocalypse of Saint John states that there will be no more oceans when the earth is purged of sins 79 and the maps of a flat earth usually portrayed it as surrounded by water as the ultimate limit. This can also be said of the modern image of the cyberspace: it is seen as astonishingly liberating and horrifyingly full of sin and danger at the same time.
The sea was not only an anomic space -it was a frontier that separated the known and the ordered world from the unknown one where laws did not apply. As a result, even after the sea and the land beyond it were appropriated (or at least appropriation attempts were made) there was no equality of legal status between the European mainland states and their overseas colonies, because the latter were an 'outer space' beyond the sea. 80 The liminal nature of the sea as a borderline between two separate worlds was only eradicated in the modern era (first and contestation where force could be freely used). 81 The rayas signified an intention to control: first and foremost to control the land beyond the seas, but also, even if as a secondary effect, the seas themselves, because they were vital for control of the land as a military and cargo route. Therefore, the rayas were paradigmatic of the closed seas where water is an extension of territorial sovereignty. However, neither
Portugal nor Spain was able to de facto exert and maintain control over the seas.
Therefore, the later French-English 'amity lines' delimited the border between order, law and prognostication on 'this side' and anomie -disorder, anarchy and contingency which prevailed beyond the line either in the sea or on an unpartitioned, not yet appropriated land which was, in a way, an empty space. 82 On 'this side' of the line it was possible to make a decision which could establish and determine order for structuring relations between persons or political entities and thus creating an 'outer side' where no legal, moral or political order was possible.
Hence 'outer side' is a permanent state of exception: first, a negative projection of The only serious attempt to challenge Grotius' view was that of Selden who, in The Grotian doctrine of the free sea prevailed for around 300 years. First and foremost the doctrine was embraced by the main sea power of that time Great
Britain which had abandoned Selden's views as soon as it had achieved the dominance of the seas, and later the US followed suit. However, as soon as the major maritime powers' support to the Grotian doctrine started to weaken, the system began to falter. 94 Indeed, the freedom of the sea was only possible either when there were no powers able to exert full sovereignty over the sea (the original Grotian solution) or one country was able to maintain the power over the sea and patrol it. The latter ability was also illustrated by the early formulation of the 2 nd century Roman jurist Marcianus' doctrine of the freedom of the sea (Digest of Justinian, Book I Chapter VIII) which was based on the Rome's ability to control the Mediterranean Sea. 95 Upon the increase of the number of maritime powers increasingly able to compete with the Britons (primarily the likes of the US, Japan, and Germany), arose a need for a negotiated regulation and the law of the sea or otherwise a major conflict resulting in a division would be unavoidable. 96 Therefore, the principle of the free sea which before World War I appeared to be an irreplaceable principle, soon afterwards due to increasingly bold attempts to gain as much jurisdiction over the sea as possible marked a return to almost Selden-like strategies. 97 Evidently, a threat to security and/or vital interests of the states (and particularly the stronger and more influential ones) acts as catalysts to change the immeasurable and impossible to effectively control, in a clear contrast with the time of Grotius. Also, the ability to exploit resources, often found in particular concentrated spaces and not in the entire sea in general (e.g. oil and gas) made sovereignty over at least some areas of the seas of paramount economical and military importance. 103 Furthermore, in a nowadays world which has been completely appropriated and which is increasingly imagined as populated by humanity rather than by particular nations, the existence of 'amity lines' that divide order and anomie is hardly imaginable. Therefore, global spaces such as the sea and the air (and, as it will be argued later, the cyberspace) have to be normalised and ordered and included into the everyday imagery in such a way as to reflect the economical and political developments and the power divisions that are present on the firm land.
COMPARING THE GLOBAL SPACES
If the two global spaces -the sea and the air -are compared, the air should be seen as much more divided than the sea. Under the current international law the airspace above a state's physical territory and above its territorial waters up to the limits of the atmosphere belongs to the sovereign domain of that state, which 99 Ibid., p. 
APPROPRIATION, TRADE, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE

PIRATE
As the sea had been transformed into a limitless trade and military transit route, so was the position of a pirate transformed from a noble adventurer into an outlaw or, according to Grotius, an enemy of whole humankind (hostis humani generis). 112 As a result, the pirate could not be encountered as an equal because of the pirate being positioned outside of the laws of war; hence he must be simply destroyed, and the war against pirates is always just. and foremost represented the interests of Dutch merchants, a pirate who posed as much danger to sea trade as an enemy vessel had to be completely outlawed, 115 just as the ships which belonged to Portugal or Spain, because these states, adhering to the image of the closed seas, were seen as attempting to hinder free maritime trade. 116 Today similarly to the sea pirates cybercriminals are challenging the global flows of finance and property. Cyber threats include copyright infringement (not surprisingly, the main push for legal sanctions against peer-topeer (P2P) file-sharing sites, for example, the Piratebay, come from the copyright holders, i.e. multimedia, film, music, and software industry 117 ), identity theft and denial of service (DoS) attacks, often committed for financial benefit. 118 Although in mid-twentieth century maritime piracy was seen as a phenomenon of the past -and therefore was barely mentioned in most sea-related treaties and other documents regulating the high seas at that time 119 -currently the danger piracy poses is as acute as ever. Quite naturally, the states appear to pursue a situation-based and context-specific modus operandi as to tackling piracy when a specific problem arises -and not only regarding piracy but also when other maritime security threats such as smuggling weapons and drugs are concerned.
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The relatively recent surge in pirate activity clearly illustrates that once the opportunity is ripe, for example, there is no strong local government capable and/or willing to tackle pirate activities, supply of offenders is vast because of widespread poverty combined with existing guerrilla movements or militias attempting to finance pirates' activities. Also, the opportunities to carry out pirate activities occur more than occasionally. Current situation in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia is the most evident example of current sea piracy, although East Africa, the Nigerian coast and South China seas have been and still are dangerous, while the Malacca Straits have been a hotspot until recently. (with some help from outside forces, especially from India and several European states that had volunteered to assist), they were once again pushed forward by the global community at various levels. 126 And yet, such global response cannot be fully understood without noting that both the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Straits are important shipping routes, crucial to global trade. This fact helps to explain why these two regions attract more global attention than others and why Somali pirates are (and the Malacca Straits pirates were), in a sense, enemies of whole humankind to a larger extent than others.
Notably, maritime piracy, being significantly less 'ethereal' than its counterpart in the cyberspace, is significantly easier to tackle, however, the phenomenon has never been completely destroyed. Under current international law, a state can seize any pirate vessel or a vessel held by pirates, and the courts of the country that had carried out the seizure have the jurisdiction to try the offenders. 127 Such actions are not only endorsed by customary international law but most probably would also be in line with the human rights treaties; this is at least suggested by the European Court of Human Rights, for example, in the Medvedyev case, 128 especially in circumstances when imminent danger to persons and/or property is present. 129 As a matter of fact, suppression of piracy is so entrenched in theory and practice of the law of the sea that it has been used as a model for regulating combat against other illegal activities. 130 However it would be difficult to transfer existing practices from the material world to cyberspace, e.g. the challenge
is not only the ability to seize but also to determine what the vessel (the set of data used for malign activity) is, let alone to apply the nationality principle effectively. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REGULATING THE GLOBAL SPACES
The history of treatment of the sea also reflects the basic pathways that a regulation of any global space might take. First, there is a possibility of complete appropriation and division, i.e. absolute sovereignty of several states over the entire space as reflected by the rayas drawn by the Spanish and the Portuguese.
Second, there also is a possibility of freedom to use and exploit the global space leading to a near-anomie, i.e. the crux of the Grotian doctrine, when no state is able to exert full control over a space (or when a dominant power benefits from such freedom, as Britain did). The third solution is a combination of both and is possible when both the means and the incentives to control the global space (or at least large segments of it) are present, but the competition for control and the stakes of failure to do so are high enough so as to foster a compromise and collective appropriation. The latter option appears to be more or less already in place concerning the regulation of the airspace and the most likely in the long term concerning the cyberspace.
The fundamental question at stake is also found in Grotius but possibly as old as any enquiry into human order: how do people come to acknowledge and follow a will, an order, a sovereignty? 132 Or, in this case, how could one push forward a more or less universally accepted form of regulation, and how (if at all) it could be enforced? Once again, the development of the law of the sea can be illustrative.
Historically, several conditions have contributed to its development: first, the very existence of a common order and the possibility of prognostication has always been an inclusive interest of all states; second, as it could be expected, change was relatively smooth when vital strategic interests of at least some powers were not at stake; when they were, more often than not the inclusive interest of many has overcome the exclusive interest of some (as was the case with the Grotian theory spaces is still subject to the power game among the most powerful states. In this power game two conflicting aims of actors can be outlined: 1) to preserve (and/or expand) one's influence; 2) to change the status quo into a more favourable one.
The multi stake-holder approach, advocated by the US, is a clear illustration of the first aim, even if not a completely outright one.
Currently cyberspace is supervised by several non-profit bodies, based in the US and under significant influence from the US government, and partly regulated by markets, once again dominated by the US (leaving aside the fact that most of the content in cyberspace is generated in the US). This stands in stark contrast to international regulation, e.g. by the ITU, which has only indirect influence over the Internet; moreover, after the failure of the World Conference on International
Telecommunications, a consensus on international governance seems even less likely. 135 Thus, although cyberspace is, in theory, free and self-regulating, in reality it often acts as an extension of the US 'soft power'. As a result, the US strongly reject any transfer of regulatory power to international agencies, including those within the UN system, presenting it as hampering competition and restricting the existing freedoms. 136 In this, the US act similarly as Britain did in upholding the Grotian doctrine of the free sea of which it was the master. 137 Therefore, the current situation in the cyberspace could be compared to the crisis of the regulation of the sea after the rise of new potent powers at the beginning of the 20 th century.
As an additional crucial issue related to sovereignty, one could add that borders in general have multiple importance. They are not only the limits of sovereign power but also a matter of inclusion and exclusion, declaration of what does and what does not belong to the 'us' of a political community. They are also about classification and stratification, both external and internal. In addition, they create a common space, a sort of 'public sphere' by filtering its content. Therefore, they have to be constructed and managed. 138 As a result, the control of borders and the (material or immaterial) flows through them is also of vital importance to sovereignty.
Security is the second crucial issue. As more and more strategic functions of the state and corporate bodies, including those of control and command, are transferred to cyberspace, cyber warfare emerges as a new, more sophisticated form of conflict (similarly, the appropriation of the sea had once created naval warfare, and, much more recently, the appropriation of the air had created aerial warfare). As in the 'physical' world, states, privateers and brigands (including terrorists), with their different motivations, grievances, aims, and degrees of sophistication provide a wide spectrum of sources of threat that cannot be ignored. 139 Controlling (and often policing) cyberspace is, then, of strategic (and sometimes even vital) importance. Therefore, the aforementioned hegemonic struggle appears to be set not only to continue but to intensify even further. All things considered, increased regulation of the internet appears to be unavoidable. The issue that remains, however, is central: how to achieve an agreement between the states and other core actors of the cyberspace. And it is
here that one could and should take important lectures from history. 
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